When Expel researcher Marcus Hutchins uncovered a novel malware loader built around an “everything but the kitchen sink” design, he dubbed it SynkLoader, a nod to the dizzying sprawl of components crammed inside: PowerShell, Python, C#, native code, an entire bundled Python runtime, and even a deceptive Windows 11 lock screen.
TL;DR
- SynkLoader is a multi-language “kitchen-sink” malware loader distributed via Microsoft Teams phishing.
- Dubbed “SynkLoader” because it packs in everything but the kitchen sink, the malware’s moniker shows how an off-the-cuff name can say a lot about the threat it describes.
- A good name helps defenders spot the same threat (and keeps attackers from becoming celebrated villains).
When Marcus Hutchins discovered SynkLoader in August 2026, it wasn’t called SynkLoader. It wasn’t called anything at all. But since Marcus was the first to sniff out this new malware family, the honor of naming it fell to him. Something he’s “really bad at” (his words, not ours): “I can never think of good names,” he laughs.
That’s how a lot of threat naming works, as it turns out. Whoever gets there first picks the name, and the results range from descriptive to downright silly.
Here’s how SynkLoader got its name (and why a good name matters more than you might think).
What is SynkLoader?
SynkLoader is a modular malware family that leans hard into a “throw everything at the wall and see what sticks” philosophy. Distributed via clever Microsoft Teams phishing, where attackers pose as IT Service Desk to trick users into downloading a fake “PowerShell Cleaner,” it packs a wildly over-engineered attack chain into a single payload.
To bypass security tools, SynkLoader stitches together a bizarre patchwork of programming languages (PowerShell, Python, C#, and C++/native code—sometimes blending three in a single module). Once it slips onto a system, it bundles a complete, self-contained Python environment to run an obfuscated loader, deploys a fake lock screen to harvest domain credentials, and establishes network tunnels so attackers can walk right through the front door.
It’s a sprawling, kitchen-sink monster of a loader designed for one primary goal: staying quiet in memory while giving threat actors direct, hands-on-keyboard control of a victim’s network.
Where did SynkLoader get its name?
We just called it a kitchen-sink monster, so you can probably see where this is going. “It just has so much stuff,” says Marcus. “So I was like, ‘Perfect. Sink loader.’ So that’s how it ended up dubbed SynkLoader.”
There’s so much “stuff” in SynkLoader that Marcus isn’t even sure how much intention was behind its creation. “I actually don’t know if they were trying to accomplish a goal or they were sort of just cobbling together whatever they could find,” he says. He suspects its developers used AI to write it, or at least to string everything together.
His theory: “They asked [AI] for X feature, and it came in PowerShell. And then they asked it for Y feature, and it came native. And they sort of just cobbled together all these different components.”
Under the hood, that means bundling a complete, self-contained Python installation just to execute its core script on standard Windows machines. From there, it strings together an over-engineered mosaic of code: PowerShell for initial execution, Python for C2 communications, and native DLLs for persistence. And the cherry on top: a custom “PhishLocker” application that simulates a Windows 11 lock screen to near perfection.
Everything but the kitchen sink.
Intentional evasion tactic or AI-generated junk drawer, the end result is a chaotic, memory-resident payload cleverly built to fly under the EDR radar.
How do malware and threat actors get named?
Naming threats across the cybersecurity industry is a surprisingly messy business. Without a single central authority handing out official titles, the process often comes down to whoever spots the threat (or whichever vendor’s marketing department gets to press publish first).
Some vendors focus on the threat actors themselves when choosing names. But James Shank, Expel’s director of threat operations, points out that that shines the spotlight on the wrong side of the attacker-defender relationship.
It’s the defenders protecting companies, says James, who need glorification. “The attackers should not be made into comic book characters,” he says. “Our naming standards are aimed at trying to combat that.”
Take HexagonalRodent, a nation-state threat actor consisting of six teams. “I was like, ‘Hexagon,’” says Marcus, who discovered the group. Then he looked at the names of the malware used in HexagonalRodent (OtterCookie and BeaverTail). “Those are both rodent-ish animals,” he says. “So six, rodent… perfect.” (Note that he said “rodent-ish”—he knows an otter isn’t a rodent.)
It’s hard to build a fan club around a name like that. The format caught on, too: A few later groups got the shape-plus-animal treatment, like CylindricalCanine and CuboidalCanine. And for a while, the team considered making shape-plus-animal an official convention.
But Marcus points out a problem with committing to that plan: Expel is a little too good at finding threats. “There aren’t really enough shapes and enough categories of animals,” he says. So he keeps it simple, opting for something fun that makes sense for that specific threat, à la SynkLoader.
“I really like the name Contagious Interview because it tells you exactly what it is,” says Marcus of a name coined by Palo Alto Networks’ Unit 42. “It’s malware that’s distributed by interviews.”
Why do names matter to defenders?
A distinct name is how researchers at different companies figure out they’re looking at the same thing. That’s what happened after Expel published the SynkLoader research.
“I got reached out to by quite a lot of other analysts who reported that they were seeing the same thing,” Marcus says. “They actually were able to give us more IOCs.” The analysts also confirmed that the attackers had reused the same fake Teams identity across many attacks; according to Marcus, the attackers were still using that identity two weeks after our post on the topic went live.
“That creates an opportunity for us to work with the community to source more IOCs and reconfirm techniques,” says James, “that then lead to even greater detection capabilities to protect our customers.”
So SynkLoader may not be a name that Marcus is especially proud of. But it still did what a threat name needs to do: Other analysts could find it and tell us they were seeing it too.
